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Law’s Evolution and Law as Custom 
WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON* 
To the extent that people share a purpose when they consult law, law 
itself could be said to have a purpose.  “For what purpose do people 
consult the law?” asks Laurence Claus in his elegant and insightful book,
Law’s Evolution and Human Understanding.1  He answers: not for 
enlightenment about what they ought to do, morally.2  Lawyers are not 
moral experts and they are not consulted as such.3  The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct authorize moral advice but emphasize its tactical
utility.4  Therefore, Claus seems to suggest, the purpose and effect of 
law is not to fix what one ought morally to do.5  The purpose for which 
people consult legal experts is, rather, to learn what to expect others to
do.  People consult legal experts to learn what the experts predict will 
happen if one or another of certain alternative courses of action is taken. 
Often such a purpose presents itself as a request for assistance in
achieving certain goals, but of course, that would encompass getting some 
assurance that the means proposed by the lawyer will succeed.  Law,
* Regents’ Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at Georgia State
University. 
1. LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 2 (2012). 
2. Id. 
3. See id. 
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2014) (“Advice couched in
narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations,
such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant.  Purely technical legal advice,
therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral 
and ethical considerations in giving advice.  Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as 
such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively
influence how the law will be applied.”).






   
 
 
    







   
  
  








therefore, is a “purely predictive signaling system.”6  This will be news 
to those who think that laying down norms and making predictions are 
essentially distinct activities, and that law is essentially in the former
business rather than the latter. 
Claus says, “Once we understand our community’s legal system to be 
a purely predictive signaling system, we can see that its value to us does
not depend on claims that those who contribute to law have a ‘because I
said so’ right to be obeyed.”7  The suggestion here seems to be that a purely 
predictive signaling-system account of the nature of law is uniquely able
to unlock the insight that because-I-say-so authority cannot be the source 
of law’s value.  That would be claiming too much.  Many deny that
because-I-said-so authority is now or could possibly ever be possessed 
by a legal system or its officials; but the persuasiveness of that denial
does not depend on the acceptance of a purely predictive signaling 
account of legal systems.  In saying this I do not deny that a purely
predictive signaling system would have value.  But I doubt that the value 
a legal system has, when it has value at all, can well be understood purely in
terms of predictive signaling.
Claus is aware that law’s signals function not merely as predictors but
as efficient causes of what they predict.8  Thus, he speaks of law as an
effective predictor, even of law as a source of “self-fulfilling predictions” 
of what others in the community will do, forming a “self-perpetuating
system” of such predictions.9  Here is where law and custom link up in 
Claus’s account: “The law of a community is the expression of its 
customs.”10  But law is not mere custom.  It grows out of a particular
kind of custom widely distributed across human communities: a custom 
6. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 5.  Brian Bix notes that, 
[t]he Scandinavian legal realist, Karl Olivecrona similarly argued for understanding
legal rights and obligations as “signals” (this was his way of making up for the 
fact that, in his view, such rights and duties did not refer to anything in the 
world—he thought that rights and duties were like money: no referent but 
signals for behavior that works as long as people follow them). 
Letter from Brian Bix, Professor, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., to author (May 7, 2014) (on 
file with author).
7. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 5. 
8. See id. at 7. 
9. Id. 
10. Id.  Strikingly, “the expression,” not “an expression.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Presumably, customs can either remain unexpressed or find expression. Despite the 
singular pronoun, I doubt that Claus means to suggest that law, and law alone, is capable 
of expressing customs pertaining to officials—much less customs in all their variety.  It 
is customary, for example, to address judges as “Your Honor,” but it is a further question 
whether that form of address is legally required.  And, even so, a legal requirement may
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“of following leaders.”11  This custom enables leaders to “supply self-
fulfilling expressions of many more customs.  And those expressions, along 
with our existing descriptions of group customs, are what we come to
call . . . laws.”12 
So, Claus tells us two things about the normativity of law: the first 
negative, the second positive. The negative point is that law’s normativity, 
also known as a law’s authority, does not and cannot involve a because-
I-said-so right to be obeyed.13 I agree with this, but I want to restate it in 
terms that bring out somewhat differently what it is about because-I-
said-so authority that makes it so implausible.  Because-I-say-so authority 
involves the supposition that acts of obedience have some intrinsic value 
that stands apart from whatever instrumental value they have.  Suppose a 
flight attendant possesses because-I-said-so authority to manage the
passengers’ response in an emergency.14  Suppose the plane ditches in
the surf just off an uncharted island and is about to sink.  Thus, if the flight 
attendant tells a passenger to get bandages instead of water, and the
passenger can plainly see that water will be more useful than bandages,
the passenger’s getting bandages instead of water possesses intrinsic 
value, even if outweighed.15  To paraphrase David Estlund, we should be
tolerant of an authority’s small errors.16 That means doing as they say
unless it would be catastrophic. I agree with what I expect Claus would
say: there’s no intrinsic value in following someone’s mistake, be it minor
or otherwise. 
Claus’s positive point about law’s normativity is more muted, and I 
want to state it in terms which may not precisely capture his view.  The 
positive point, as I understand it, is that the normativity of custom is the 
key to understanding the normativity of law.17  I agree with this too, but
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 7–8. 
13. Id. at 6. 
14. See  DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAMEWORK 124 (2008). 
15. See id. at 125. 
16. See id. 
17. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 7–8. Brian Bix wonders, “Is there perhaps also a
connection to be drawn here between Claus’s view and that of the classical English
Common Law commentators, who claimed that common law judging was not law-
making, but rather the discovery of ‘immemorial custom’?”  Letter from Brian Bix to 
author, supra note 6. That connection would of course seem more attenuated in today’s
“age of statutes.” See generally  GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
877








      
 




















then the question of the normativity, if any, of custom has to be
confronted. I suspect that Claus would be skeptical of the notion that 
community custom possesses any because-I-said-so type of authority.
But, then, does custom possess, ever or sometimes, some other kind of 
normativity? What is it, and how can it come about that people ever 
have a duty to go along with the customs of their communities? By
shifting the focus from a sovereign to a community we also tentatively
reattribute any correlative right to obedience.18  Can the community ever 
have a moral right to its members’ obedience to its customs?
All of this has to be worked out because legal discourse centrally, and 
necessarily, involves a family of normative expressions—“obligation,” 
“right,” “permission,” and so on—whose surface grammar parallels that
of moral discourse.  Claus’s most extensive discussion of moral normativity 
appears by way of a parable of prelegal castaways on a desert island.19 
We are to assume that “the right thing to do” is to forcibly keep the
piggish child from helping himself to an inordinate share of the unowned
reserve of food and water.20 By this, I understand Claus to mean that the
piggish child has a moral duty to restrain himself, and that all others, 
whether or not affected, have a moral permission to restrain him if he
will not, or cannot, restrain himself.  “What [moral] difference would it
make if this incident occurred after we had law and government?” Claus 
asks.21  His answer seems to be: none, but with this qualification: 
Ultimately, we humans each think through for ourselves the rightness of what
we do, including the rightness of individual uses of force against others,
regardless of what the law predicts.  Notice, however, that in weighing reasons
for acting . . . the fact that [a] particular action is signaled by our community’s
legal system adds a distinctive reason to do the action.  That added reason for
action is the good of having the legal system—of having a community identity
that comes through an effective signaling system . . . .22 
The good of having such a system is very great, as Claus emphasizes again 
and again.  But, to be exact, the weight that the system and relevant signal
add has got to be discounted in our deliberations. 
Th[e] reason for doing what the system predicts we will do varies in weight
from one instance of action-choosing to another, depending on how much
danger to the system’s predictive effectiveness is posed by the particular
STATUTES (1982) (noting that the legal system has shifted from one once dominated by
court-divined common law to one in which statutes are the primary source of law).
18. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 14–15, 24. 
19. See id. at 20. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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instance of potential nonconformity and depending on how valuable the legal 
system really is.23 
Claus offers an illustrative example.  “If a judge disregards existing law
when deciding disputes, that obviously hurts law’s predictive effectiveness
more than if a late night pedestrian jaywalks . . . .”24 So, the judge should 
give observing the law great, though not decisive, weight, and the late-
night pedestrian may in good conscience give the law negligible weight.
I do not think I am alone in finding this analysis problematic.  One 
objection is this: it is difficult to understand how a judge is supposed to 
disregard, or regard, “existing law” if existing law is nothing other than a 
prediction of what a judge will do.  A more serious objection is that it 
seems to leave the judge free to depart from existing law whenever she 
may do so without detection. But it seems to be a mistake to say, for
example, that if a judge believes that punishing insider trading is unjust, 
then she should feel morally free to frustrate the enforcement of laws 
against insider trading on any pretext that effectively conceals her motive.
It may be that Claus can avoid these and other unpalatable implications,
but I would rather explore what I think is right about the underlying idea. 
The desert island example assumes there is no customary scheme of 
rationing, but it nonetheless presupposes that there are moral norms of
distribution such that each of the islanders has a right to some of the
resources but not all of them, and that all are morally permitted to
enforce that limit.25  So, altering Claus’s question, what moral difference 
would a custom make, if it makes any difference at all?  A custom can
satisfy the antecedent of H.L.A. Hart’s “mutuality of restrictions” principle,
also known as the “fair-play” principle.26  If others subject themselves to 
rules so that all benefit, then in fairness I have a duty also to abide by
those rules, provided that sufficiently many others can be expected to do 
so as well.27  The principle and its application to the problem of authority
have been controversial, but what Hart said in 1955 remains true today: 
“political obligation is intelligible only if we see what precisely this is 
23. Id. at 22. 
24. Id. 
25. See id. at 21. 
26. See H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 185–86 
(1955).
27. See id. 
879
   
  

























    
   
 
      
 
and how it differs from the other right-creating transactions (consent, 
promising) to which philosophers have assimilated it.”28 
The story Claus offers about the evolution of leadership, or, more
precisely, the custom of following leaders, can be recruited here. We
humans are social animals, and we are here at all only because we have 
descended from a very long chain of ancestors, who were able to
reproduce only because they found shelter and succor within a group. 
Claus approvingly quotes Niklas Luhmann’s dictum that “there never 
have been societies without law,”29 and this is because, as Claus says,
“[g]roups that are effectively led compete successfully against groups that
are not.”30 Group-selectionist theories have been readmitted to serious
discussion in evolutionary biology after a long exile.31 (The idea that led 
groups out-survive unled groups can be traced back to Warder Allee.32) 
But it is not entirely accurate to think that this process merely involved 
“gene pools that reliably produced persons who liked to lead and persons 
who liked to follow.”33  What is correct is that it involved gene pools
that reliably produced persons who are moral.34 
The theory of natural selection faces a prima facie difficulty in explaining 
why people are moral, ever.  That is, it faces a difficulty in explaining 
why people should ever take anyone’s interests into account other than 
their own.35  In the terminology of evolutionary biologists, “altruism” 
28. See id. at 185. 
29. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL 
SYSTEM 488 (Fatima Kastner et al. trans., 2004) (1993)). 
30. Id. at 13. 
31. See John Beatty, Ecology and Evolutionary Biology in the War and Postwar
Years: Questions and Comments, 21 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 245, 246–247 (1988); Mark E. 
Borrello, The Rise, Fall and Resurrection of Group Selection, 29 ENDEAVOUR 43, 43–44, 
47 (2005). 
32. See  WARDER CLYDE ALLEE, COOPERATION AMONG ANIMALS: WITH HUMAN 
IMPLICATIONS 204 (rev. ed. 1951) (discussing how well-organized flocks of hens with an 
established social hierarchy are more successful and produce more eggs than unorganized,
unled flocks). 
33. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 13. 
34. I do not say that all persons are naturally moral, or that none are natural 
leaders or followers.  The point is rather that most people are naturally attuned to rules
and cheating. See id. at 14. The groups that survived the million years or so of hominin 
history were the groups in which most members were naturally disposed to be on the 
lookout for rules and naturally disposed to look to the group as the enforcer of those 
rules. See id. at 13.  Call these rules the customs of the group, some of which, as Claus 
rightly notes, are constitutive of the group’s identity. See id. at 14. Leaders are those 
who act as agents of the group, and Claus describes compellingly how groups come to
delegate authority to individuals to administer the customs of the group.  See id. at 13– 
15, 17. 
35. See ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON,  UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION 
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refers to any behavior that is costly to the actor but beneficial to someone 
else, where benefits and costs are cashed out in terms of reproductive 
fitness.36  How could altruists thrive, over evolutionary spans of time, in
a population, when by definition they are disposed in ways that enable 
egoists to out-reproduce them? 
Evolutionary biologist William Hamilton proposed that altruists would 
in fact out-reproduce egoists if egoism meant not making any sacrifices
to benefit one’s close kin.37  Altruists would exhibit “inclusive fitness” 
through the mechanism of “kin selection.”38  But this proposal left
unanswered the question: how did humans evolve a morality that
respected unrelated humans? Paleoanthropologists tell us that, for millions 
of years, humans and their ancestors lived in bands averaging  above
twenty-five members.39  Bands of this size were proficient at hunting, but
too numerous to consist exclusively of close blood relatives.40  Why did 
the kinfolk-only altruists not out-reproduce the whole-group altruists,
reducing human bands to sizes too small to survive by hunting large and
elusive game? 
Evolutionary biologist Robert Axelrod showed how groups of unrelated
individuals who are disposed to follow cooperative rules and punish 
cheaters could thrive and out-reproduce groups dominated by free riders 
and pure egoists.41  Where groups can benefit by cooperation, rules 
punishing freeriding can secure that benefit.42  True, pure altruists might
seem to be able to secure the benefits of cooperation too, but Axelrod 
showed that an individual strategy of tolerating cheaters would lose out 
36. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful 
Altruism, 250 SCIENCE 1665, 1665 (1990).
37. See W.D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. I, 7 J. 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1, 1, 11 (1964). 
38. See Michael J. Wade, Kin Selection: Its Components, 210 SCIENCE 665, 666 
(1980).
39. See Bruce M. Knauft et al., Violence and Sociality in Human Evolution, 32 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 391, 393 (1991). 
40. See  CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, HIERARCHY IN THE FOREST: THE EVOLUTION OF 
EGALITARIAN BEHAVIOR 199 (1999).
41. See  ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 49–53 (1984). 
Computer-simulated tournaments demonstrated that the nicer, more cooperative “TIT 
FOR TAT” strategy thrived for successive generations, tournament rounds, while 
exploitive, less cooperative strategies gradually dropped out of the tournament.  See id.
42. See Özgür Gürerk et al., The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions, 




















    
   
 
 
     
   
   
 
       
 
 
in the long run.43  The hardiest strategy by far, he showed in a celebrated
series of simulations, was the simplest: “TIT FOR TAT,” which means
treat everyone else cooperatively at the outset, but thereafter do as done 
unto by the other in the prior round.44  In effect, shun a cheater.  Further 
studies have discovered better strategies, but Axelrod’s larger point
remains.45  A disposition to cooperate but shun noncooperators is better than
a purely egoistic disposition or a disposition to limit one’s cooperation to
one’s kin.
Now comes a problem.46  Cooperative norms are sustainable only if
cheaters are punished.47  Although an environment in which cheaters are 
punished is fraught with risks to all involved, studies show that people
tend to gravitate toward sanctioning institutions and away from sanctionless
ones.48  But not every instance of cheating hurts someone.49  Sometimes, 
even often, there is a temptation to free ride.50  A cooperative benefit can 
be realized if most sacrifice their immediate advantage, but often it can
be realized even if a few slack off.51  One “beater,” more or less, might 
43. See AXELROD, supra note 41, at 52 (determining that strategies that allowed 
exploitation were less successful than the TIT FOR TAT strategy).
44. Id. at 13. 
45. Id. at 38–40; see also Lorens A. Imhof et al., Tit-For-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-
Shift?, 247 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 574, 574–576 (2007) (analyzing a study of four 
different cooperation strategies to promote win-stay, lose-shift as a superior strategy
lacking the disadvantages of the tit-for-tat strategy); Martin Nowak & Karl Sigmund, A 
Strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift That Outperforms Tit-For-Tat in the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game, 364 NATURE 56, 56, 58 (1993) (suggesting win-stay, lose-shift remedies 
the two primary weaknesses of the tit-for-tat strategy rendering it as a better strategy for 
cooperation behavior). 
46. I am indebted to Keith Jensen correcting me in midcourse as I have made my
way through some of this literature. 
47. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 
NATURE 137, 137 (2002).
48. See Gürerk et al., supra note 42, at 109. 
49. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 64 (2004).  As Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher write, “if
only second parties imposed sanctions, a very limited number of social norms could be 
enforced because norm violations often do not directly hurt other people.”  Id.  Moreover, the
second-party sanctions are more difficult to disambiguate from mere dominance-seeking 
aggression. See Katrin Riedl et al., No Third-Party Punishment in Chimpanzees, 109
PNAS 14824, 14826 (2012).
50. See Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-
Rider Problem, 1 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 78, 79–80 (1989). 
51. See id. (“[T]he potential exists for actors to enjoy the fruits of the sanctioning 
system without bearing any costs associated with its creation and maintenance.”); see
also Pamela Oliver, Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective 
Action: Theoretical Investigations, 85 AM. J. SOC. 1356, 1362, 1369 (1980) (discussing 
how individuals may be incentivized to defect because the belief that perfect unanimity
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not affect the success of a mastodon hunt, but the slacker will want a 
share too, and there is more than enough for everybody.  The cost to an 
individual of punishing a slacker is greater than the benefit the punisher 
will garner for himself.52  How can cooperative groups not be eroded by
free riding at the second level?  Without third-party punishment, cooperation
withers, but third-party punishers incur a cost.53  Those who are indifferent 
to norm violators, except when they are directly hurt, would tend to out-
reproduce those who are disposed to engage in costly punishment.54 
This is the puzzle of third-party punishment,55 or what Karthik
Panchanathan and Robert Boyd call the “second-order free-rider 
problem.”56 
Claus indirectly suggests that the puzzle is solved by punishing those
who fail to punish cheaters.57  The problem with this is that only in very
specialized environments, such as military academies, is failure to
report—much less, to punish—a violation itself punishable.58  To  
complicate matters further, in experimental settings in which the human
subjects are all authorized to punish others in a second round of a
standardized “public goods game,” they often exhibit puzzling and even
perverse behavior. In summary, these experiments support the following
propositions: (a) people will normally express a sentiment favoring 
punishing a cheater, even if they are not directly affected; (b) people show 
no reliable willingness properly to administer costly third-party 
52. See Fehr & Gächter, supra note 47, at 137 (stating that cooperation and 
punishment are costly and yield no pecuniary benefits).  But see Fehr & Fischbacher,
supra note 49, at 85 (“[A] large percentage of subjects are willing to enforce distribution 
and cooperation norms even though they incur costs and reap no economic benefit from 
their sanctions.”). 
53. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 47, at 137. 
54. See Bettina Rockenbach & Manfred Milinski, To Qualify as a Social Partner, 
Humans Hide Severe Punishment, Although Their Observed Cooperativeness Is
Decisive, 108 PNAS 18307, 18311 (2011).  Accurate punishers of course can realize a
net benefit from having a reputation of being so, but, surprisingly, experimental subjects 
do not appear to select punishers over other cooperators as social partners, and punishers 
even take pains to conceal their readiness to punish.  See id.
55. See Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 49. 
56. See Karthik Panchanathan & Robert Boyd, Indirect Reciprocity Can Stabilize
Cooperation Without the Second-Order Free Rider Problem, 432 NATURE 499, 499 
(2004).
57. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 16. 
58. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 6965 (2012) (noting that if Naval Academy officers fail
to report hazing activity conducted by their subordinates, the officers face punishment up




























   
punishment, even when all players are explicitly authorized to do so;59 
and (c) it is difficult to design an experiment to test people’s willingness 
to engage in third-party punishment without at least implicitly signaling 
to them that they are authorized, and perhaps expected, to do so and may 
be monitored as to how they exercise that authority. 
Other studies show the advantages of single-punisher arrangements, in
which a single player in a cooperative game is known to all players to be 
the sole player authorized to punish.60 This is consistent with Claus’s
idea that “[l]eadership may exist among us long before we are conscious 
of really needing it.”61  Taken together, the empirical findings to date are 
consistent with the thesis that although people naturally hate cheaters,
they are naturally inhibited when it comes to punishing cheaters.  That 
natural inhibition is overcome if the actor is either a direct victim or has
been specifically authorized to punish.  In these latter instances, people 
readily punish even where doing so is costly to them and gains them 
nothing. But when they are authorized along with all others,
uncoordinatedly, they are bad at it. Not only is a wide diffusion of
responsibility a notoriously iffy way of assuring that someone takes 
responsibility,62 errors and excesses constantly threaten to spur an escalating 
spiral of retribution and counter-retribution.63  Human cooperation and 
human morality were adaptive because the permission to punish was
never distributed in a diffuse, Lockean way.  An inhibition of the natural,
retributive impulse was adaptive.  The groups likeliest to thrive were 
those which delegated the business of enforcement to some subset of the 
whole, often to a powerful leader. 
59. See Matthias Cinyabuguma et al., Can Second-Order Punishment Deter 
Perverse Punishment?, 9 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 265, 278–79 (2006); Benedikt Herrmann 
et al., Antisocial Punishment Across Societies, 319 SCIENCE 1362, 1362 (2008). 
60. See, e.g., Rick O’Gorman et al., Constraining Free Riding in Public Goods 
Games: Designated Solitary Punishers Can Sustain Human Cooperation, 276 PROC. 
ROYAL SOC’Y B. 323 (2009). 
61. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 13. 
62. See John M. Darley & Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: 
Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968); James M.
Hudson & Amy S. Bruckman, The Bystander Effect: A Lens for Understanding Patterns 
of Participation, 13 J. LEARNING SCI. 165, 165, 170 (2004). 
63. See Laurent Denant-Boemont et al., Punishment, Counterpunishment and
Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment, 33 ECON. THEORY 145 (2007); 
Nikos Nikiforakis, Punishment and Counter-Punishment in Public Good Games: Can
We Really Govern Ourselves?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 91 (2008). In experimental designs, 
setting aside problems of error and excess in the administration of punishment is 
tempting because accounting for such types of error can “add sufficient mathematical 
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The punisher or order-keeper role is a regulated one in hunter-gatherer 
societies living today and even, as Claus notes, in chimpanzee groups.64 
It is possible to discern a line from the early Pleistocene circumstances
of human existence, or about one to two million years ago, up to the 
advent of agriculture, forty thousand years ago. This is the “early
evolutionary environment,” and it contains the major determinants of 
any native normative endowment that we humans possess.65  It is  
therefore natural, in this sense, for people to be legal, that is to say, to 
regard the enforcement of serious customs and moral norms as a matter
for their group, in the first and final instance.  The argument is reinforced by
anthropological evidence adduced by Christopher Boehm and others for 
the hypothesis that early human societies, in contrast to primate
societies, exhibit a “reverse dominance hierarchy,” that is, a pattern of 
restraints that keep the most powerful member of a group from lording it 
over all.66  Of course, the most powerful member is also very likely the
most effective order-keeper and custom-enforcer.  Therefore, the evolution 
of human societies and human social dispositions has had to maintain
equipoise between tendencies toward dominance and tendencies contrary to
dominance.  Morality and cooperation among humans first became possible 
when “reportorial” punishment—gossip—made it possible for the weaker 
members of a group to assure that the group’s designated rule-enforcer
dealt with cheaters without becoming oppressively dominant.
This story offers some normative resources that are not obvious in
Claus’s more streamlined account. Cooperative rules that succeed would 
quickly become customary.  But it is also clear that such rules are
normative, that is, they rest on and give reasons that reflect interests that 
encompass but are not limited to those of the individual actor or her kin. 
Some customs are mere customs, in a sense that is often contrasted with
moral rules. But many customs are morally binding, especially where
they represent entrenched solutions to important coordination problems.67 
These customary rules are normative also in the robust sense that they 
are not mere factors to be weighed on each occasion by each individual, 
64. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 13.  Order-keeping and third party punishment 
should not be equated. See Riedl et al., supra note 49, at 14824. 
65. See William A. Edmundson, Politics in a State of Nature, 26 RATIO JURIS 149 
(2013), and sources cited therein. 
66. Christopher Boehm, Egalitarian Behavior and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy, 
34 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 227, 236–37 (1993). 






















    










   
but are presumptively binding.  The practices of the community form a 
link between some (doubtlessly complicated) general moral principle 
and official acts intended to trigger moral consequences, in the form of
moral duties, for actors within the range of that principle.68  The  
normativity of such customary rules would be expressed and maintained by 
enforcement of some kind, whether persuasive or coercive. But the
enforcement of these rules had itself to be governed by moral norms that
restrict the degree and agency of justified punishment.  I do not think 
that Claus would deny that in such circumstances the community would
come to have a right—defeasible, of course—to enforce the customary
norms believed essential to the group’s cohesion and survival. And
punishment cannot intelligibly be administered solely for the offense of 
getting the balance of all reasons wrong.  Punishment makes sense only
in the context of presumptively categorical norms.
The community is not merely the happenstantial holder of sundry 
rights correlative to undirected, general moral duties.  As Stephen Perry
has pointed out, the Hohfeldian moral power that is the nubbin of political
authority, as traditionally conceived, belongs to a different category from
any aggregate of disconnected moral liabilities.69 Claus promisingly 
suggests that a custom of following leaders is what both systematizes
and extends the reach of existing community customs,70 or of those of 
them that are, as Hart put it, “in some sense non-optional” because backed
by “serious social pressure.”71  The universal human custom of following
leaders, which Claus speaks of, is itself an expression of something more
deeply embedded.72  It is in our nature to refer the application of the
“serious social pressure” that backs a community’s moral norms either to 
the community itself as “the Entirety”—the anthropologist E. Adamson
Hoebel’s term73—or to its leadership. 
68. Cf. David Enoch, Authority and Reason-Giving, 89 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES. 296, 299–300, 310 (2014) (pointing to authoritative directives as the catalyst for 
normative changes in the reasons for actions).
69. See Stephen R. Perry, Political Authority and Political Obligation, in 2 
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 1 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2013). 
70. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
71. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82, 169 (Paul Craig ed., 3d ed. 2012). 
72. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
73. E. Adamson Hoebel, Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in the Study of 
Primitive Law, 51 YALE L.J. 951, 955 (1942).  The term is also used by Carl Schmitt:
The oldest justification for parliament, constantly repeated through the 
centuries, takes into account an extreme “expedient”: The people in its entirety
must decide, as was originally the case when all members of the community
could assemble themselves under the village tree.  But for practical reasons . . . 
one helps oneself quite reasonably with an elected committee of responsible 
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The community benefits if it appoints leaders to manage the group’s 
norms.  Holmes’s remark that the business of government cannot always
be done in a town meeting or an assembly of the whole74 is as true of 
Pleistocene hunter-gatherers as it was of the burgeoning city of Denver, 
Colorado.  The master custom that Claus invokes, that of following leaders, 
is itself a solution to the problems that diffuse enforcement of other
“primary” cooperative norms would create.75  Robert Nozick’s critique of
Locke’s “natural executive right” explains why.76  “Do-it-because-I-say-
so” grew out of “Do-it-because-we-say-so-and-I-am-the-one-permitted- to-
make-you-do-it.”77 
Not every solution to a coordination problem creates a moral duty.78 
But if coordination problems are endemic in social life, and there is a pro
tanto moral duty to comply with those customs that suitably solve those 
problems (and are not merely Nash equilibria at a low level of overall
benefit) then that might tell us something about how we stand vis à vis a 
signaling system that effectively predicts how instances of those problems
will be dealt with. It is not superstitious to think that there is an at least
pro tanto moral duty not to disappoint the expectations others have
reasonably formed about how one will conduct oneself in what Scott
Shapiro has called “the circumstances of legality.”79  True, such a duty is
not the same as a duty to do as the law says simply because it says so. 
But that nonidentity should encourage rather than squelch the hope that a 
worthy conception of political authority is within reach. 
So, Claus has not shown that the idea of authority is empty, although 
he has shown, as others have, that a certain conception of authority is 
implausible.  I do not mean to disparage the importance of dismantling 
this empty conception of the nonempty concept of authority: it has
CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 34 (Ellen Kennedy trans., 
1988).
74. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
75. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
76. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–182 (1974). 
77. See id. 
78. Moral errors on the part of others can trigger moral duties on one’s own part.
Suppose actor A belongs to a group that observes custom C, which it believes to be
morally obligatory.  If a catastrophic panic will result if A does not conform to custom C, 
then A has a pro tanto duty to conform to custom C, and this is so regardless of whether
custom C is otherwise morally obligatory to follow. 































enabled great injustices and harms.80  The positive achievement of Claus’s
argument consists in the linkage he makes between law and custom, or
more exactly, between the authority of law, properly conceived, and the
authority of custom. 
Political authority, as traditionally understood, consists in a moral
power to impose moral duties by mere say-so.  On any workable construal
of this conception, official utterances of certain officials must satisfy the
antecedent of some true, general moral principle whose consequent is
that citizens have a moral duty they would not otherwise have had.  The 
perennial difficulty is that no proposed general principle of the needed
scope has escaped controversy.  On the reconception I endorse, and
which I think Claus has proposed, there is no principle that can
instantaneously generate a moral duty unless there is a strong general 
disposition to treat official utterances as a sufficient guarantee of future
cooperative behavior.  “Instant custom” sounds like an oxymoron on the 
same order as “instant tradition.”  But it is not.  If traffic is uncontrolled on 
the streets, creating a serious coordination problem of moral importance,
and people customarily solve serious moral problems by doing what 
Simon says, then, if Simon says, “Drive on the right,” presto, there is a
general, pro tanto duty to drive on the right.  Now, were Simon to have 
said instead, “Drive on the right because I say so,” there can still be a 
pro tanto duty to drive on the right. But Claus is right to stick a needle 
into Simon’s balloon in this latter case.  Simon’s signal generates duties 
only because of the normativity of custom.
Often, the custom of following a leader’s signals is imperfect.  It may
be that the leader signals “drive 55 mph” but the custom that develops is 
“drive 65 mph.”  It would be tedious to insist that drivers are nonetheless 
morally obligated to drive 55 rather than 65.  There is slippage between 
the signal the lawgiver sends and its customary effect.  Moral duty tracks
the customary effect, unless of course the effect is beyond the bounds of
critical morality.  The traditional conception of authority wrongly represented 
the sovereign’s commands as instantly, frictionlessly imposing duties.
Custom is among the sources of law.  That much is universally agreed.
But custom can also be law, independently of promulgation, as many, 
but not all, have agreed. This raised further questions. Is custom
normative, and if so, how?  Insofar as a customary norm is or becomes a
80. He suggests, correctly I think, that contractualist accounts of political obligation
have perversely tended to perpetuate the conception of political authority as a because-I-
said-so moral power. As Claus explains, social-contract contractualism ousted the divine 
pedigree theory of political authority but retained the idea that political authority consists 
in something like a because-I-said-you-could-say-so moral power, but one conferred 
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legal norm, does it manifest or acquire a different kind of normativity?
Or does its original normativity contribute to the normativity of law?
The answer I favor, and I think Claus favors, is that law’s normativity is
derivative. In being codified, a custom does not acquire its normativity. 
Rather, legal promulgation depends upon custom for whatever normativity
it confers. 
This view will have to be worked out with answers to related questions
having to do with custom as a condition of legal validity.  Kelsen wrote 
that the doctrine of desuetudo states a necessary condition of a norm’s 
legal validity.81  In contrast, Hart’s view was that desuetudo is a doctrine 
that a legal system might take or leave, and that norms that are customarily 
ignored may nonetheless possess legal validity.82  I incline toward Kelsen’s
view even though it seems to involve a paradox.  Law can have any content 
whatever, he believed, but it cannot validly, or at least not coherently, 
include the denial of the doctrine of desuetudo.83 
In summary, my hypothesis, and I hope Claus’s, is that every legally 
normative utterance resolves into one expressing (a) custom-implicating 
moral normativity, (b) custom-extending moral normativity, or (c)
normativity “in the manifesto sense,” to borrow a phrase of Joel Feinberg’s:
the proclamations of leaders whose effectiveness is marginal or imperfect
can have this manifesto quality.84  I leave aside official utterances that do 
not purport to describe obligations and so are not normative, directly 
anyway, in the relevant, obligation-implicating sense.  Thus, I set aside 
those official utterances that purport to express solely the kind of
conditional normativity typical of warnings, “obligings,” rather than 
“obligations,” in Hart’s sense; and I likewise set aside those that serve
only to express what could be called “recipe normativity,” the kind that
attaches to statements of how to do what we do not have to do if we do
not want to (such as writing a will or forming a contract). 
81. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 172–73 (Anders 
Wedberg trans., 1961) (1945). 
82. See  HART, supra note 71, at 103.  Kelsen’s attachment to desuetudo is as 
ironic as Hart’s doctrine that unpracticed but valid primary legal rules exist.  One would 
expect existence to follow from validity, efficacy or no efficacy, for Kelsen, given the 
positing of a grundnorm; for Hart, one would expect nonexistence to follow from 
desuetudo, validity or no validity, given his practice theory of rules. 
83. See KELSEN, supra note 81, at 119. 
84. JOEL FEINBERG, Nature and Value of Rights, in  RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE 
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 143, 153 (1980). 
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If this is correct, there is no such thing as a distinctively legal brand of 
normativity.85  Claus overstates that “[w]hen we say that [someone] has
an obligation to [do something], we mean a moral obligation.  There isn’t 
really any other kind.”86  Well, whether there is or there is not, sometimes
people mean to say there is.  More than a few sincerely think legal idioms
express a special, perspectival, or “scare quote” kind of normativity.
The manner in which various normative idioms are jumbled together is 
what makes an understanding of distinctively legal normativity so elusive. 
And, of course, expressing normativity and possessing it are two different 
things. Whatever kind of normativity legal utterances express, moral 
normativity, either custom-dependent or custom-extending,87 is the only
kind of normativity they can actually possess. 
What I have said so far has not addressed a further issue: that of the 
content of law.  If the only kind of normativity law can possess is moral
normativity, it is tempting to take a further step and say that the content
of law simply is the moral difference that specified official acts succeed,
in the right way, in making.  This is the step that Mark Greenberg proposes
we make.88  I suspect that the plausibility of his proposal will turn on 
85. This is not quite—yet?—the consensus view, but it has broken out of the
workshops and specialist journals into the pages of a leading generalist law review.  See, 
e.g., Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288 (2014); 
Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2015). 
86. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 103.  “Law may add concrete detail to [one’s] moral 
duty,” however, “by . . . telling us [what] other[s] . . . will expect.” Id.  Putting the point 
this way seems oddly circuitous.  If what others expect me to do can change what my
moral duty is, it must be that the expectations of others about what I will do are reasons 
for me to do as they expect.  And Claus does endorse this, too: “Law is effective at 
predicting what you will do because law gives you reasons for doing it” by contributing 
“to your understanding of what others will likely do and expect.”  Id.  So, it looks as 
though Claus’s view is that the only duties we have, broadly speaking, are moral duties 
that derive from the balance of all reasons, but certain details of what moral duty requires
can be gleaned from the expectations of others, as encapsulated in propositions of law. 
Whether one has an obligation to serve in the military is a matter of moral obligation; 
legislation cannot create such a duty but it can signal where and when one “should” 
report for duty.  I cannot give an unqualified endorsement to this as a picture of moral 
obligation because (a) I think categorical moral restrictions and moral permissions are
not so easily assimilated into a view that represents moral requirements as entirely a 
matter of case-by-case balancing, and (b) I see no reason why the expectations of others
should not be capable of determining what is morally required in gross, as well as in 
detail.
87. Some utterances of law merely duplicate independent moral truths.  In such 
cases, Claus and others may be correct in thinking that the normativity of such utterances 
is mere reflection.  I incline toward what I take to be John Gardner’s view that law’s 
taking an obligation seriously adds something, even if the obligation is already a moral
one. See Richard Marshall, Law as a Leap of Faith, 3:AM MAG. (Sept. 6, 2013),
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/law-as-a-leap-of-faith (interview of John Gardner). 
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how plausibly the qualification “the legally proper way” gets spelled out,
as he acknowledges he has yet to do.89 
One thing that Claus’s approach and Greenberg’s approach have in 
common is the recognition that law takes up a role on an already-set 
normative stage, and that it is this backdrop that gives shape to the moral
difference that officials may make.  Legal theory need not invoke a
newfangled shadow normativity to explain what goes on in the gap
between what officials attempt to do and what they succeed in doing. 
Greenberg attributes the mistake to the assumption, plausible as it may 
be, that legal content, involved as it is in texts, is a linguistic content.90 
Of course it is puzzling how linguistic legal content can have normative 
force if, as seems obvious, texts are not per se norms, moral or otherwise.
The official production of texts (written or oral—I’ll call them “utterances”)
may trigger (David Enoch’s useful term) moral obligations, but it can
also fail to do so.91  The tenor and even the effectiveness of official
utterances seem to require that they invariably generate norms of some
kind, which then either earn morality’s imprimatur, or do not. Hart
proposed a neat solution: there are legal norms, which are all and only 
those norms that satisfy certain criteria which legal officials recognize as 
validating.92  Officials regularly produce legal utterances that are candidate
moral norms, usually successful candidates if circumstances are right, but 
invariably are legal norms. 
The move that Hart made that has caused the most trouble, in my
view, is that of disjoining two sets of social practices from one another. 
One set of social practices consists of those that, together, constitute the 
effectiveness of a legal system.  The other set consists of official, or
“insider,” practices that constitute the existence of a special social rule 
he called the rule of recognition.  (Hart attracted criticism for his practice 
theory of rules, but that is not the problem I am trying to describe.)
Once this disjunction is taken seriously, the effectiveness of a legal norm 
is conceived as one thing, and its existence as another, and its moral 
value of course yet another.  The norms that form the content of the legal
system are those picked out by operation of the rule of recognition, rather 
than those adopted as, and having impact as, social, supra-official practices.
89. See id. at 1323 & n.72. 
90. Mark Greenberg, supra note 85, at 1295–96. 
91. See David Enoch, Authority and Reason-Giving, 89 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RES., 296, 299 (2014). 


















Up to a point, of course. If officials’ utterances and social practices are
at too great a variance, there isn’t a legal system; but the legality of a 
given norm is not conditional on its having any effect whatsoever outside,
or even inside, the official circle.  The “criteria” of a rule of recognition 
are capable of reaching norms that have yet to, and might never, appear
on any official’s psychological radar screen.93 
The alternative picture that Claus offers is one that highlights the
customary social background.  Custom is normative, and law works by
channeling custom-in-gross into progressively finer and more precise
grooves.  If there is normative moral value resident in the custom of
elevating and following leaders, then that normativity ought to flow
downstream into the finer channels officials carve and into the fresh
territory they wish us to occupy.  In places, that flow is too diluted, and 
normativity trails off.  In places, officials direct the stream over a cliff,
and it is no longer normative at all.  In places, the stream is overtaken by
stronger normative streams and can only make a difference yet farther 
downslope, where it reaches to details of procedure, compensation, and 
punishment.  Empty channels into which custom does not reach are 
simply not law.  Nothing is gained by saying that legal normativity
flows there. 
93. In this regard, Hart’s account shares an implausible feature with Dworkin’s: it
is committed to the legal validity of unknown and never-to-be-known norms.  It is not, 
however, committed, as Dworkin’s is, to the legal validity of humanly unknowable 
norms, and the legal invalidity of all humanly believed and knowable norms. 
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